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Security

Security model

Onyx is deployed on Solana's test network and has not yet been externally audited. Use test funds only. The demo vault on this site is a browser simulation and holds no assets.

Threat model

How Onyx responds
to each threat

Each row describes what an attacker controls, what they attempt, and the program rule that prevents it.

Attacker controlsAttempts toPrevented by
The owner's private keyWithdraw the vault's fundsHigh-risk transfers are held. The owner or guardian can cancel them or rescue the vault, and no hold can be released early.
The owner's key, over timeReplace the safe harbor or remove the guardian, then withdrawA safe harbor change waits 7 days and the guardian can cancel it. Removing the guardian waits for the hold delay. Every pending change is visible in the app.
The guardian's keyTransfer funds out of the vaultNot possible. A guardian can only cancel, freeze, remove token delegates and rescue, and a rescue can only go to the safe harbor.
The guardian's keyBlock every outgoing transferThe owner removes the guardian after the hold delay. A guardian cannot cancel its own removal.
A phishing siteGet the vault to approve a drainer or sign for another programNot possible. The vault only transfers SOL and tokens: it never sets a token delegate and cannot call any program other than the token programs.
Address poisoningInduce a transfer to a look-alike addressA large transfer to a new address is held, which leaves time to verify it. Always check the full address.
Website downtimePrevent the owner from respondingHolds are enforced by the program on Solana, not by this website. Cancel and rescue instructions can be sent to the program directly, for example with a script.

Known limitations

The boundaries of protection

What Onyx does not protect against, stated plainly, so you can decide what to keep in a vault.

  1. 01Only vault funds are protected.

    Onyx does not control transactions from your regular wallet.

  2. 02Instant limits can be spent.

    Anyone holding your key can move funds up to your instant and daily limits without delay, including transfers to saved addresses within the daily limit. Set limits to an amount you can afford to lose.

  3. 03Holds delay transfers; they do not block them forever.

    If an attacker holds your key, waits out every delay, and no one responds, funds can eventually move.

  4. 04The safe harbor must be independent.

    If it shares a seed phrase or device with your main key, a rescue cannot protect your funds.

  5. 05Transfers only.

    The vault moves SOL and tokens and nothing else: swaps, staking and other applications are not available from inside it. This removes a whole class of phishing attacks, and also means those applications cannot be used with the vault.

  6. 06Token issuers keep their powers.

    A token's issuer can keep a freeze authority over every account, the vault included, and a Token-2022 token can also give its issuer a permanent delegate that can move it. Tokens with transfer hooks cannot be sent or rescued by the vault.

  7. 07The current program is upgradeable.

    Its deploy key can still replace the program. Whether the mainnet program is made immutable or upgradeable behind a delay will be decided before mainnet.

Development status

Progress toward mainnet

Completed work, the current test deployment, and the requirements before mainnet.

  • DoneTest-driven program development

    42 instruction tests cover every row of the permissions table, with SOL, SPL Token and Token-2022. Property tests (20,000 random cases each) verify the rule logic, and two randomized attack runs (18,000 steps each) verify that the guardian key alone only moves funds to the safe harbor, that the owner key alone cannot execute a hold or loosen a rule early, and that no more funds leave the vault than entered it.

  • DoneStatic analysis

    Clippy, the Rust linter, reports no findings.

  • LiveSolana test network

    Vault program 6m7CyxisjrsVNjjcQmHRv3ZjzcnHfjJgpwo7pBjprZrM. Not yet audited, and upgradeable.

  • PlannedExternal audit

    Required before any mainnet launch with real funds.

  • PlannedAutomated guardian service

    A service that reviews held transactions and sends alerts.